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 Schedule slippage plagues the space industry, and is antinomic with the recent emphasis on space 
responsiveness. The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly noted the difficulties 
encountered by the Department of Defense in keeping its acquisition of space systems on schedule, 
and identified the low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the system/payload under development 
as a principal culprit driving schedule risk and slippage. 
In this paper, we analyze based on data from past space programs the relationship between 
technology uncertainty and schedule risk in the acquisition of space systems, and propose an 
analytical framework to identify appropriate schedule margins for mitigating the risk of schedule 
slippage. We also introduce the TRL-schedule-risk curves to help program managers make risk-
informed decisions regarding the appropriate schedule margins for a given program, or the 
appropriate TRL to consider should the program’s schedule be exogenously and rigidly constrained. 
We recommend based on our findings, that the industry adopts and develops schedule risk curves 
(instead of single schedule point estimates), 2) that these schedule risk curves be made available to 
policy- and decision-makers in acquisition programs; and 3) that adequate schedule margins be 
defined according to an agreed upon and acceptable schedule risk level. 
 
 
Nomenclature 
 
env(RSS)  =  envelope of RSS 
f (.)  = probability density function 
FTD   =  Final Total schedule Duration 
IDE   =  Initial schedule Duration Estimate 
LB   =  lower bound of the RSS envelope  
R2  = coefficient of determination in a regression analysis 
RSS  = Relative Schedule Slippage 
sm   =  schedule margin  
TRL   =  Technology Readiness Level 
UB  =  upper bound of the RSS envelope  
WTRL   =  Weighted average TRL 
Z  = standard normal random variable 
! 
RSS    =  sample average of RSS  
! 
RSS   =  modeled average of RSS  
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! 
UB   =  modeled upper bound of the RSS envelope  
α  = multiplicative constant of the mean RSS exponential model 
α’  = multiplicative constant of the upper bound RSS exponential model 
λ  = rate of the mean RSS exponential model 
λ’  = rate of the upper bound RSS exponential model 
µ  =  mean of the random variable RSS  
σ  =  standard deviation of the random variable RSS  
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly noted 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5  the difficulties 
encountered by the Department of Defense (DOD) in keeping its acquisition of space systems on 
schedule (and within budget): 
 
“DOD’s space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several 
decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars; 
stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks. In some cases, 
capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development.” 1 
 
Several reasons testify to the criticality of maintaining space programs on schedule. First, the cost 
penalties associated with schedule slippage can significantly strain a program’s budget, and in 
some cases jeopardize the (financial) survival and continued (political) support for the program. 
Second, the recent emphasis by the DOD on accelerated acquisition cycles in general, and on a 
more responsive space in particular—i.e., the ability to develop and launch a space asset on orbit 
within a very short timeframe—is fundamentally at odds with schedule slippages in acquisition 
programs. 
 
Identifying the root causes of schedule slippage, and understanding the mechanics of their 
subversive influence, is critical for the DOD and other Federal agencies’ acquisition functions. 
Furthermore, eliminating these causes and better controlling program schedule is increasingly 
emphasized as a priority. Chittenden6 for example advised that “in order to resolve these enduring 
[schedule] concerns, the United States Air Force should pursue using schedule adherence or 
“SAIV” (schedule as an independent variable) as the first order programmatic driver for the 
majority of its acquisition programs.”  
 
What drives schedule slippage? Several factors come to mind as possible culprits. For example, it 
is easy to conceive of a system’s complexity as having an important influence on the ability of a 
manufacturer or system integrator to stay on schedule or not—the more complex the system, the 
less likely its development can remain on schedule. Similarly, “requirements creep” can 
significantly perturb the development schedule of a system and result in major delays. This paper 
deals with a third factor that has been identified in several GAO reports as a principal culprit 
driving schedule slippage, namely the low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the 
system/payload under development.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore, in the case of space systems, how much 
schedule risk/slippage is associated with various levels of technology maturity or TRL, and to 
identify appropriate schedule margins to mitigate the risk of schedule slippage. In the following, 
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we assume that schedule slippage is a random variable—more precisely, a random vector or an 
indexed family of random variables with TRL as the index—and we propose to characterize 
through data analysis and modeling the central tendency and dispersion of this random variable as 
a function of TRL (the independent variable in this study). To this effect, we briefly describe in 
Section 2 the TRL concept and highlight the relationship between technology uncertainty (i.e., 
low TRL) and schedule risk. In Section 3, we discuss and characterize the data used in our study. 
In Section 4, we analyze the data and provide analytical models for schedule risk and slippage as 
a function of TRL (and schedule margins). In Section 5, we conclude with some implications and 
recommendations from our work. 
 
II. Technology Readiness Level and Schedule Risk 
 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is a widely adopted metric by NASA and the DOD; it 
was introduced by NASA in the 1980s, first to assess the maturity of a particular technology 
before its implementation in a system, and second, to allow the “consistent comparison of 
maturity between different types of technology.”7 This metric is organized on a scale of nine 
levels corresponding to key stages of development of a given technology. A brief description of 
these levels is provided in Table 1; the reader is referred to Mankins7 for a more detailed 
description of these levels. 
 
Table 1. Summary of different Technology Readiness Levels 
 
TRL 
 
Summary description 
TRL 1  
 
Basic principles observed and reported 
TRL 2  
 
Technology concept and or application formulated 
TRL 3  
 
Analytical and experimental critical function and/or 
characteristic proof-of- concept 
 
TRL 4  
 
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment 
 
TRL 5  
 
Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant 
environment 
 
TRL 6  
 
System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration 
in a relevant environment (ground or space) 
 
TRL 7  
 
System prototype demonstration in a space 
environment 
 
TRL 8  
 
Actual system completed and “flight qualified” 
through test and demonstration (ground or space) 
 
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful 
mission operations 
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The lack of technology maturity or low TRL, sometimes described in the literature as technology 
uncertainty, is often associated with schedule risk, albeit qualitatively. Browning 8  defines 
schedule risk as the “uncertainty in the ability of a project to develop an acceptable design […] 
within a span of time, and the consequences thereof.” The author also defines technology risk as 
the “uncertainty in capability of technology to provide performance benefits (within cost and/or 
schedule expectations), and the consequences thereof.” By their definitions alone, these concepts 
suggest a close relationship between technology uncertainty and schedule risk. In fact, in a study 
conducted by Gupta and Wilemon 9  of large technology-based firms, “about 58% of the 
interviewees cited technological uncertainties as a major reason for delays.” The link between 
technology uncertainty and technology maturity is intuitive: the more mature a technology is, the 
more knowledge is available concerning its development, manufacturing, and mode(s) of 
operation. This, in turn, provides a higher confidence level that the mission requirements will be 
met. As a result, technology uncertainty in the project is reduced. Therefore, maturing technology 
is critical to completing a program on schedule and within budget.  
 
As often noted by GAO, schedules overruns are most likely to occur when the burden of 
technology maturation is assumed within an acquisition program.10 Indeed, as the low-TRL world 
(research environment, or S&T in government parlance) and the high-TRL world (e.g, 
development and production) are significantly different and do not always interact seamlessly, it 
is hard to predict how smooth this maturation process will be, and more importantly, how much 
time it will take to bring a low TRL technology (e.g., TRL = 4) to a comfortable level of maturity 
(e.g., TRL = 8). This issue is sometimes referred as the TRL gap and is described by George and 
Powers11 as “the problem of efficiently transitioning a new technology from concept to viable 
product in the shortest possible time and at the least cost.”  
 
In the following, we propose to quantify the relationship between technology uncertainty and 
schedule risk using TRL as a proxy for the former. We start in the following section by describing 
the data collected for our analysis. 
 
III. Data Description 
 
Paradoxically, despite the fact that technology readiness level is a central theme in feasibility 
studies of system design (spacecraft and other), limited TRL data is available to the technical 
community for analysis—unlike other parameters such as system cost for example for which 
quantitative data and a number of (cost) models exist and are widely available. In some cases, 
when TRL is discussed in the technical literature, qualitative maturity levels 
(“Low/Medium/High”) are employed.  
 
For the purpose of this study, we were provided with programmatic data from 28 NASA 
programs. Lee and Thomas12 used this data to construct probability-based models for the cost 
growth of NASA’s programs. Details about this data can be found in Ref. 12. In this study, we 
focus instead on schedule slippage and concern ourselves with three parameters from the data set: 
 
1. TRL at start of program 
2. Initial schedule Duration Estimate (IDE)  
3. Final Total schedule Duration (FTD) 
 
We define the Relative Schedule Slippage (RSS) as the percentage schedule growth given the 
initial schedule estimate: 
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IDE
IDEFTD
RSS       (1) 
 
Recall that the objective of this paper is to quantify how much schedule risk/slippage is 
associated with different levels of technology maturity or TRL. Given this objective, we perform 
a regression analysis on the data and investigate the relationship between TRL and RSS. We 
analyze both the central tendencies and the dispersion of RSS as a function of TRL and relate our 
results to schedule risk and slippage. The details are further discussed in Section IV. 
 
Before we proceed however, a subtlety concerning the TRL data should be addressed: 
 
Lee and Thomas12 calculated a weighted average of TRL for each program (WTRL), by taking 
the “TRL of each component multiplied by their corresponding percent of the allocated cost 
against the entire program’s cost”.  
 
! 
WTRLprogram = wi " TRLci
componentsci
#              where 
program
i
i
cost
cost
w =    (2) 
 
In our study, we used the WTRL as a preliminary basis for the “average system-TRL” whose 
influence on schedule slippage we investigated. The WTRL is proportional to the amount of 
resources spent for each component. Components with a small wi are either of minor importance 
in the design, or their TRL is already sufficiently high to limit the allocated cost for their 
development and implementation. In both cases, it is reasonable to assume that such components 
will not critically impact the advancement of the schedule, which justifies the use of the WTRL 
for our schedule analysis. However, this WTRL calculation results in a value with decimal digits. 
Such a degree of precision was not relevant for our study. To obtain the average system-TRL, the 
final step consisted in taking the integer part of the WTRL. Here again, when considering 
components requiring a large resource investment, we contend that those with the lowest TRLs 
drive the schedule delays, as they represent the “slowest links” of the maturation chain. For 
example, consider a program whose WTRL is 4.62. If it involves components with TRL 5 or 6, it 
also involves components with integer values of TRL less or equal than 4. First, the WTRL of 
4.62 gives a good indicator of the “average TRL” of the entire system. Then, considering that 
components with low TRL (e.g., TRL = 4) have a bigger impact on schedule slippage than 
components with TRL 5, we retained the integer value, that is TRL = 4.§ 
 
IV. Modeling Schedule Slippage and Risk 
 
For each of the 28 NASA programs in our data set, we plot and analyze the doublet (TRL; RSS) 
where the TRL consists of the integer values discussed in the previous section. The TRLs in our 
data set range from 4 to 8. We consider the relative schedule slippage a random variable—more 
precisely, a random vector or an indexed family of random variables with TRL as the index. In 
the following, we analyze and model both the central tendency and the dispersion of this random 
variable as a function of the independent variable in this study, namely TRL. 
 
                                                
§ Following these logics, one could argue that the minimum of all the components’ TRLs could be directly 
used in place of the WTRL. However, we think it is important to capture first the relative importance of 
every component in terms of the amount of resources spent. The WTRL provides this function. 
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A. Mean relative schedule slippage  
 
We capture the central tendency of RSS by its mean or average value, which for a given TRL is 
defined as follows: 
 
! 
RSS
j
=
RSSi
n
i=1
n
"
TRL= j
      (3) 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean RSS for each TRL. For example, for a TRL = 4 at start of the program, 
Figure 1 shows that an average 78% schedule slippage has been observed in all 28 programs 
considered—in other words, programs’ schedules have been consistently underestimated by 78% 
when the TRL at start of the program was 4 (this is low maturity technology in the context of a 
space acquisition program). Similarly, when TRL at start of the program was 7, Figure 1 shows a 
mean RSS of 19%. 
 
More generally, Figure 1 shows a monotonically decreasing average RSS as a function of TRL. 
This result can be interpreted as follows: the quality of the initial schedule estimate (IDE) at start 
of the program improves (i.e., is more accurate) as the technologies considered for the program 
are more mature. Conversely, the lower the maturity of the technology considered, the less we 
can predict with accuracy the actual schedule or FTD (i.e., the bigger the error in the program’s 
initial schedule estimate). While this result may be considered intuitive, Figure 1 provides an 
empirical confirmation of this intuition. 
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Figure 1. Relative Schedule Slippage (RSS) for 28 NASA programs  
(mean, max, and regression analysis) as a function of TRL 
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To analytically reflect this trend, we propose to model the mean relative schedule slippage with a 
decreasing exponential function of TRL, and perform a regression analysis on our data set to fit 
the model parameters. Equation (4) represents the model structure: 
 
! 
RSS =" # e$%#TRL       (4) 
 
We chose this model structure both for its simplicity and conceptual relevance. A polynomial fit 
of order n >1 for example would be meaningless considering the small size of the sample, and the 
absence of a conceptual interpretation of the coefficients needed to ensure goodness-of-fit. More 
importantly, we needed a function that 1) accounts for the reduction of the schedule slippage with 
higher TRLs, and 2) provides increasingly smaller increments in schedule slippage as TRL 
increases. Condition 2 can be stated mathematically as follows: the absolute value of the 
derivative of the 
! 
RSS  with respect to TRL should be a decreasing function. Hence, our choice 
of a decreasing exponential function (more details in the following paragraphs). 
 
 
Table 2 shows the results of our regression analysis using this model structure (Eq. 4). A 
comparison of the observed and modeled mean relative schedule slippage is provided in Table 3. 
Our model of the mean relative schedule slippage, which consists of Eq. 4 and the value of its 
parameters in Table 2, is fairly accurate, as reflected by the coefficient of determination R2, 94%, 
and by the error between the model output and the observed data (less than 10 percent). 
 
The R2 parameter** indicates that the variability in the mean relative schedule slippage is 
primarily accounted for by the TRL. However, due to the limited size of our sample (28 data 
points with an average of 6 points for each TRL), the R2 value of our model, 94%, should be 
considered with caution and not interpreted beyond the fact it indicates an accurate model. 
 
 
Table 2. Model parameters for the average schedule slippage in our data set 
 
Model parameter Value 
α 8.29 
λ 0.56 
R2 0.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
** If 
! 
yi are the values of the dependant variable considered, 
! 
ˆ yi the fitted values, and 
! 
y the sample mean, 
the coefficient of determination is defined by 
! 
R
2
=
( ˆ yi " y )
2
i
#
(yi " y )
2
i
#
, and takes a value between 0 and 1. 
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Table 3. Model’s accuracy: mean relative schedule slippage and TRL 
 
TRL Observed mean relative 
schedule slippage (data) 
Modeled mean relative 
schedule slippage 
Error 
4 78% 88% 10 
5 57% 50% 7 
6 20% 29% 9 
7 19% 16% 3 
8 7% 9% 2 
 
 
B. Dispersion of the relative schedule slippage 
 
In addition to the mean relative schedule slippage, the data allows us to model the envelope or 
range within which the relative schedule slippage falls for each TRL. We refer to the range of the 
relative schedule slippage as its dispersion. In the following, we propose to model the range or 
envelope of RSS by the upper- and lower bound (UB, and LB respectively) values of RSS for 
each TRL level: 
 
! 
UBj = max RSSi( ) TRL= j
LB j = min RSSi( ) TRL= j
" 
# 
$ $ 
% 
$ 
$ 
      (5) 
 
 
The envelope and dispersion of our data set are defined by Eq. 6: 
 
 
! 
 env RSS( ) = UBj ; LB j{ }    
                                                 for j =  4, 5, 6, 7, 8
 Dispersion j =UBj - LB j
" 
#
$ 
% 
$ 
    (6) 
 
 
The lower-bound model (LBj) is trivial and equal to zero for all TRLs. In other words, for each 
TRL, at least one data point was found in our sample for which the initial estimated schedule 
(IDE) almost matched the actual schedule (FTD), thus resulting in an RSS almost equal to zero.†† 
Consequently, the upper-bound model is also a model of our data dispersion. 
 
We model the upper-bound with a decreasing exponential as defined in Eq. 7: 
 
! 
UB = " '#e$%'#TRL       (7) 
 
                                                
†† This was a surprising result for the low TRL (4 and 5). We can assume that for these exceptional cases a 
significant schedule margins was probably factored into the initial schedule estimate, although 
unfortunately the data we have does not allow us to verify this assumption. More details on schedule 
margins are discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 1 shows that the dispersion of RSS narrows down as TRL increases. This dispersion can 
be considered a proxy for the time uncertainty in the technology maturation process: the lower the 
TRL, the bigger the schedule uncertainty, that is, the less we can predict with accuracy the time it 
will take to complete a project. GAO5 put it more forcefully: 
 
“There is no way to estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a 
satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in a relatively 
early stages of discovery and invention.” 
 
Our results provide additional nuance to, and quantification of, this statement by GAO. Table 4 
shows the results of our regression analysis using this model structure (Eq. 7). Notice that the 
upper-bound is a scaled up version of the mean relative schedule slippage with λ' ≈ λ, and α' ≈ 2.5α. 
Mathematically, the quasi-equality of the exponential coefficients implies that the changes in the 
mean and maximum RSS values for a given TRL jump are identical (Eq. 8). In practice, this 
quasi-equality indicates that the same phenomena resulting from the technology uncertainty affect 
the mean and the worst-case (maximum) schedule slippage for the range of TRL values in our 
data set, as captured in Eq. 8: 
 
! 
RSS
TRL= j
RSS
TRL= k
"
UB
TRL= j
UB
TRL= k
     (8) 
 
Our model of the dispersion of the relative schedule slippage is fairly accurate, as reflected by the 
coefficient of determination R2 (83%). However, the same caveat regarding the R2 parameter 
discussed previously (IV-A) also applies in this case of the dispersion model. 
 
 
Table 4. Model parameters for the maximum schedule slippage in our data set 
 
Model parameter Value 
α' 20.47 
λ' 0.57 
R2 0.83 
 
 
Beyond the schedule estimation errors reflected by the mean RSS model (Equation 4 and 
Table 2)—these may be due to a variety of factors including intrinsically flawed schedule 
estimation methods in use by the industry, or misleading industry practices—the dispersion of the 
RSS data suggests the existence of other sources of discrepancies between FTD and IDE (i.e., 
other than TRL), specific to each space program (e.g., complexity of the system under 
development, experience of the program manager, etc.). Further research is needed to identify 
these other parameters and correlate them with schedule slippage. Such work would be 
particularly relevant to the space industry, as it will 1) help develop credible schedule estimates, 2) 
limit programs’ schedule risk, and 3) identify and disseminate best practices related to 
maintaining acquisition programs on schedule. The GAO reports mentioned previously (see 
Section I) constitute an important step in this direction. Academic analyses of these issues are 
required and can usefully complement the GAO reports and help disseminate the results beyond 
the reach of the traditional GAO readership. 
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C. Schedule risk curves and schedule margins 
 
The existence of a non-zero mean relative schedule slippage strongly suggests the need to add a 
schedule margin “on top of” the initial schedule estimate or IDE (said differently, traditional 
schedule estimate methods are biased and consistently underestimate actual programs’ schedules). 
In this subsection, we discuss schedule margins and introduce the concept of schedule risk curves, 
or more precisely, TRL-schedule risk curves. In particular, for a given TRL at start of the 
program, we calculate the probability of overshooting the initial schedule estimate plus a given 
schedule margin. This in turn will help us determine appropriate schedule margins, as discussed 
below. 
 
A schedule margin (SM or sm) can be expressed in the same units as IDE (e.g., months), or it can 
be expressed as a percentage of IDE; we use lower-case to denote the relative value, and 
upper-case to denote the absolute value of the schedule margin. Recall that RSS, and 
consequently FTD, which results from a linear transformation of RSS (see Eq. 1), are random 
variables. Consequently, we define schedule risk as the probability that the actual schedule (FTD) 
overshoots the initial schedule estimate plus a schedule margin, as shown in Figure 2b. 
Mathematically, we express the schedule risk for a given TRL at start of the program as follows: 
 
! 
Schedule  Risk
TRL= j
= P FTDj > IDE j " 1+ sm j( ){ }   (9) 
 
Assuming we can evaluate Eq. 9, the result would be interpreted as follows: a 20% schedule risk 
for example corresponds to a 20% chance that the initial schedule estimate plus the schedule 
margin underestimate the actual program’s schedule. Conversely, a 20% schedule risk 
corresponds to a confidence level of 80% that the actual schedule will fall within the initial 
schedule estimate plus the schedule margin. The higher the schedule margin, the lower the 
schedule risk. It should be noted that Eq. 9 is equivalent to the following: 
 
! 
Schedule  Risk
TRL= j
= P RSS j > sm j{ }     (10) 
 
In order to evaluate Eq. 9, we need to find or assume a probability distribution function for FTD 
or RSS for each TRL. The data in our sample is not rich enough to allow us to infer a probability 
distribution function for FTD or RSS. However, for the purpose of introducing the concept of 
TRL-schedule risk curve, let us assume that for a given TRL, RSS (FTD) is normally distributed. 
That is, we formulate the hypothesis that the RSS (FTD) has a normal probability density function, 
which can be written as follows: 
 
! 
f RSS j( )
TRL= j
=
1
" j 2#
e
$
(RSS j $µ j )
2
2" j
2
    (11) 
 
For a given value j of the TRL, µj is approximated by our sample average RSS calculated in Eq. 
(4) and illustrated in Figure 1, and σj represents the standard deviation, which is related to the 
dispersion of the data. Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of Eq. 10 and 11.  
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Figure 2a. RSS probability density functions for 
each TRL value 
Figure 2b. FTD probability density function 
and schedule risk 
 
 
In statistical data analysis, the standard deviation of a normally distributed random variable is 
approximated by the dispersion of a set of measurements (i.e., the sample) as follows: 
 
 
! 
" #
Dispersion
4
        (12) 
 
The reader is referred to Lyman-Ott and Longnecker13 for a discussion of this approximation. 
Finally, the probability distribution function of the RSS as defined in Eq. 11 for each TRL value 
is fully determined by the following: 
 
! 
 µ j " RSS
TRL= j
                                                 for  j =  4, 5, 6, 7, 8
 # j "
Dispersion j
4
$ 
%
& 
& 
' 
& 
& 
   (13) 
 
Given a TRL at start of a program, and an agreed upon schedule risk, we propose to find the 
corresponding schedule margin that should to be added to IDE to ensure this level of schedule 
risk. Mathematically, sm now becomes the unknown in Eq. (9) and (10). Equation 10 can be 
rewritten in terms of the standard normal distribution as follows: 
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! 
Schedule  Risk
TRL= j
 =1" Pr RSS j # sm j{ }
        =1" Pr Z # z{ } = 1" $ z( )                               (14)
with  Z =
RSS j " µ j
% j
                                                                       (15)
and  z =
sm j " µ j
% j
                                                                           (16)
  
 
   
where Z is the standardized random variable derived from RSS, and φ is the cumulative density 
function of the standard normal distribution function, whose values can be found in tabulated 
form in the literature (see for example Ref. 14). 
 
Numerical example: What should the schedule margin be if a schedule risk of 20% is called for, 
and the TRL at start of the program is 6? In this case, φ(z) = 1 – 0.2 = 0.8, and we find the 
corresponding tabulated value of z = 0.84. Using Eq. 16, we find a schedule margin of 43%. In 
other words, for TRL = 6 at start of a program, a schedule margin of 43% will ensure a 20% 
schedule risk (or conversely, that there is 80% likelihood that the FTD will fall below the initial 
schedule estimate IDE plus the 43% schedule margin). 
 
When done for all TRLs, not just one TRL value as in the previous numerical example, this 
analysis results in the construction of a family of TRL-schedule risk curves, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. TRL-schedule risk curves (SR) for a normally distributed Relative Schedule Slippage 
 
 
Schedule risk curves, as shown in Figure 3, are useful tools for program managers and 
decision-makers. These curves are can help in the following way: 
 
• When looked at through a “vertical” cut (i.e., for a given TRL at start of the program), 
schedule risk curves allow program managers to visualize the incremental schedule 
margin needed to achieve a reduction in schedule risk. For example, on Figure 3, we 
see that for TRL = 6, a schedule margin of 30% is required to achieve a schedule risk of 
50%; however, if this schedule risk is unacceptable, and, say a 20% schedule risk is 
required, then a schedule margin of 43% is required. 
 
• When looked at through a “horizontal” cut, the schedule risk curves allow program 
managers to visualize for a given schedule margin, the change (reduction) in schedule 
risk as the TRL changes (increases). For example, a 40% schedule margin for TRL = 4 
will result in a very high 80% schedule risk; however this same 40% margin will ensure 
approximately a 20% schedule risk if the technologies considered for the program were 
more mature with a TRL = 6. 
 
In short, schedule risk curves allow program managers to make risk-informed decisions regarding 
the appropriate schedule margins for a given program, or the appropriate TRL to consider in an 
acquisition program should the program’s schedule be exogenously constrained. These points are 
further discussed in the Section V along with our recommendations.  
 
Caveat: Figure 3 was created based on the model developed in section IV-A and IV-B, and given 
the assumption that RSS (and consequently FTD) is normally distributed. Should more RSS 
empirical data be available and warrant a different probability distribution function, schedule risk 
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curves can still be developed by replacing Eq. 11–16 with the new probability distribution 
function (pdf) and its parameters; schedule risk however, as defined in Eq. 9 and 10, remains the 
same irrespective of the pdf considered. The concept and usefulness of the schedule risk curves to 
program managers and decision-makers are independent on the particular distribution function for 
RSS (or FTD). 
 
V. Implications and Recommendations 
 
Schedule slippage plagues the space industry, and is antinomic with the recent emphasis on space 
responsiveness. This work focused on one key culprit driving schedule slippage, namely TRL. 
Our empirical results, based on a data set of 28 NASA programs, support GAO’s 
recommendation that, in order to reduce schedule risk, no technologies below TRL = 6 or 7 be 
included in an acquisition program:  
 
“If programs adhere to the TRL = 6 criteria, they will greatly reduce the risk of 
encountering costly technical delays, though not completely […]. Moreover, the best 
practice programs we have studied strive for a TRL = 7, where the technology has been 
tested in an operational environment, that is, space.”5 
 
Furthermore, the existence of a non-zero mean schedule slippage in our study strongly suggests 
the need to include adequate schedule margins to the initial schedule estimate (IDE). The 
schedule margin can be adapted to the schedule risk the program is willing to accept; however, at 
a minimum, we recommend that programs adopt a schedule margin that is equal (or greater) to 
the mean schedule slippage for a given TRL. For example, if the TRL = 6 criteria is adopted, we 
recommend that at a minimum, a schedule margin of 30% be adopted, since: 
 
! 
sm
6
" RSS
TRL= 6
# 30%  
 
But beyond a schedule point estimate, we recommend, 1) that the industry adopts and develops 
schedule risk curves in space acquisition programs; 2) that these schedule risk curves be made 
available to policy- and decision-makers; and 3) that adequate schedule margins be defined 
according to an agreed upon acceptable schedule risk level. For example, under the assumption of 
IV-C, at TRL = 6, we would still incur a schedule risk of 50% with a schedule margin of 30%. In 
order to “reach” the 20% schedule risk curve, we would need to include a schedule margin of 
43%. Said differently, with a 43% schedule margin, we are 80% confident that the actual 
program’s schedule will be within our initial estimate plus margin. Table 5 shows three levels of 
schedule risk and the required or corresponding schedule margins. 
 
Table 5. Schedule risk and the corresponding schedule margin for a TRL = 6 system 
 
(agreed upon) 
Schedule risk 
Corresponding 
schedule margin 
50% 30% 
20% 43% 
5% 56% 
 
 
Schedule margins and cost implications: It is important to recognize that while schedule 
margins decrease schedule risk, they do come at a cost. In other words, increasing a schedule 
margin will increase a program’s budget, and many programs may not be able to afford large 
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schedule margins (e.g., the 56% schedule margin in Table 5, which results in a trifle schedule risk 
of 5%). Program managers should therefore carefully balance the cost implications of schedule 
margins with the schedule risk that the program can or is willing to afford. In future work, we 
propose to investigate the (marginal) cost of schedule margins, and to develop an analytical tool 
for program managers to assess and trade cost, schedule risk, and schedule margins. 
 
Finally, we hope that more TRL and schedule data will be made available (to academics) in the 
future, especially for Air Force and DOD programs. This would allow to update and expand the 
results of the current work, and to include if possible a comparative analysis of schedule risk in 
various acquisition programs (space and other weapon systems). 
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